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GENERAL WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN'S GEORGIA CAMPAIGNS:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

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Between May and December 1864, General William Tecumseh Sherman conducted two highly successful campaigns through Georgia, seizing Atlanta and Savannah and inflicting significant damage on Confederate military resources. Sherman's operations were founded in thorough logistics planning, skillful movement and maneuver of a light, mobile force, and bold movement behind enemy lines without a fixed line of communications. This paper will examine and analyze General Sherman's use of operational art, focusing on the operational factors of space, time and force and the operational functions of command and control, logistics, movement and maneuver and protection. The analysis will provide lessons learned for today's operational commander, including applicability to the concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS).

Sherman's campaigns skillfully blended the advantages of terrain and mobility with maneuver, maintaining the initiative and freedom of action. Current defense initiatives point toward a leaner force, with the ability to respond to crises quickly with minimal logistics support. In future conflicts, U.S. forces may not have the luxury of secure bases of operations or a lengthy period to build up supplies prior to the commencement of hostilities. Sherman emphasized maneuver, mobility and logistical self-sustainment to the maximum extent possible. Success in future conflicts may depend on the ability of joint forces to operate very much like Sherman did in 1864.

I. Introduction. In May, 1864, General William Tecumseh Sherman launched an invasion force into Georgia from his initial base of operations south of Chattanooga, Tennessee. Sherman's campaign would end over eight months later in Savannah, Georgia. This paper will examine and analyze General Sherman's use of operational art, focusing on the operational factors of space, time and force and the operational functions of command and control, logistics, movement and maneuver, and protection. The analysis will provide lessons learned for today's operational commander, including applicability to the concept of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS).

II. Background. By early 1864, General U. S. Grant was in overall command of the Union armies. He envisioned a strategic plan in which Union armies would commence simultaneous offensive operations. Grant's goal was to increase the pressure on Confederate forces in order to prevent their mutual support or reinforcement. A key to Grant's plan was Sherman's invasion of north Georgia.

Sherman commanded a force of over 100,000 troops, organized into three armies: the Army of the Tennessee under Major General James McPherson; the Army of the Cumberland under Major General George Thomas; and the Army of the Ohio under Major General John Schofield. Sherman's objectives were specified in a letter from Grant:

You I propose to move against [Confederate General] Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources¹

Grant envisioned an operation that would directly threaten the Confederate Army of Tennessee under General Joe Johnston, and prevent Johnston's forces from reinforcing Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Between March to May 1864, Sherman

organized his forces and amassed the supplies necessary to support operations. On May 5th 1864, the three field armies under Sherman's overall control commenced the campaign.

Over the next four months, Sherman's forces made steady progress toward the Confederate railroad hub at Atlanta. Sherman employed a series of turning movements to threaten Johnston's lines of communication, forcing the Confederate commander to fall back repeatedly. By early July, Johnston was forced back to the defenses of Atlanta. The Confederate government, dissatisfied with Johnston's strategy of trading ground for time, relieved General Johnston and replaced him with General John B. Hood. The predictably aggressive Hood attacked Sherman's forces in a series of bloody battles around the city, gaining little advantage but suffering significant numbers of casualties. Sherman continued to work around the enemy's flank, eventually threatening Atlanta's last rail line of supply south of the city. Hood, faced with the prospect of a lengthy siege, evacuated Atlanta on September 1st. Union forces occupied the city the following day.

After a period of rest and re-supply, Sherman decided to drive southeast to Savannah, intent on carrying out Grant's direction to damage the enemy's war resources as much as possible. In order to deal with Hood, who threatened Federal supply lines back to Chattanooga, Sherman dispatched Thomas north with sufficient forces to protect those bases. Dividing his remaining forces into two wings and boldly severing his connection to his lines of communications, Sherman proceeded to cut a swath 60 miles wide and 300 miles long from Atlanta to Savannah, capturing the latter on 21 December. During the course of the "March to the Sea", Sherman's troops foraged liberally and inflicted significant damage on the ability of the region to provide any support to the Confederate war effort.

II. Analysis.

A. Sherman's plan.

The direction from General Grant quoted above is clear: Sherman's primary objective was the destruction of the Confederate Army of Tennessee. However Grant also directed the destruction of enemy war resources. While no specific target was named, Sherman interpreted the ultimate target to be Atlanta.² Sherman understood the importance of Atlanta, a major railroad hub and supply base, to the South's war efforts. He noted that the capture of the city "would be the death knell of the Confederacy."³ Sherman planned to threaten Johnston's forces, the enemy's operational center of gravity in the west, through a series of turning movements along a series of decisive points on the line of the Western & Atlantic railroad. Sherman's goal was to endanger the Confederate supply lines, Johnston's critical vulnerability.⁴ If he could not draw Johnston into a decisive battle in the open, Sherman would attempt to deprive him of his resources.

B. Operational factors.

Space.

The wilderness terrain of northern Georgia consisted of "deep rivers and streams, rough mountains, steep ravines, lush forests and entangling underbrush..."⁵, all of which provided excellent defensive positions. The roads, such that there were, were often in poor condition. The terrain was such that both Sherman and Johnston felt his opponent benefited. According to Sherman, "the obstructing mountains, streams and forests offset his numerical advantage"⁶ while Johnston complained that the terrain "protected Sherman's flanking movements."⁷

Sherman's objective, Atlanta, was 137 miles from Chattanooga. This lengthy line of communication was a great drain on Sherman's resources, requiring him to dispatch large numbers of troops to guard his railroad supply line. As Sherman advanced, his line of communication would become longer and more vulnerable, while Johnston's would grow shorter as he retreated towards Atlanta. The distance from Atlanta to Savannah is approximately 300 miles. This area was rural in nature, essentially unscathed by the war prior to 1864.

Force.

At the outset of his campaign, Sherman's forces consisted of approximately 100,000 troops divided into three armies. The Army of the Cumberland under Thomas had 50,000 men; the Army of the Tennessee under McPherson had 35,000; and the Army of the Ohio under Schofield had 15,000.⁸ These forces were opposed by Confederate General Joe Johnston's Army of Tennessee, consisting of approximately 42,000 troops. Both armies consisted of seasoned veterans, with strong morale and will to fight. By the time Sherman reached Atlanta, his force numbered 81,000 due to casualties and the need to detach forces to protect his line of communications.⁹

Sherman commenced his march to Savannah with approximately 60,000 troops. In preparation for this movement he "...purged his forces of the weak, wounded and sick..."¹⁰, retaining a core of battle hardened troops. After Hood's movement to the north there was little opposition, as "...there were no defenders worthy of the name on Georgia's soil..."¹¹ In Sherman's path stood "an inadequate state militia, composed largely of boys 16 and under and men of 55 and older."¹² The primary threat to Sherman's forces was posed by

Confederate General Wheeler's cavalry and some militia, totaling about 7,000 men. In addition, there were approximately 15,000 troops in the Confederate garrison at Savannah.

Time.

The overall timing of the start of Sherman's campaign was critical, as a key component of the overall Union strategic plan. Sherman was required to commence his offensive in conjunction with four other offensives. After assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi on March 18th, Sherman had less than two months to prepare for the Spring campaign. He took aggressive action to ensure manpower and logistics readiness.

As discussed above, the distance from Chattanooga to Atlanta was 137 miles. The campaign would be a lengthy one, with Sherman's speed of advance affected by the rough terrain and by Johnston's opposition. There was no specific timetable, though it was clearly desirable to achieve success as quickly as possible. While holding a disdain for politics, Sherman was aware that a victory would be a boon for northern morale as well as Lincoln's prospects in the November 1864 election.

C. Operational Functions.

Operational Command and Control.

Sherman functioned as theatre commander of the Union forces, with Thomas, McPherson and Schofield as his primary subordinates. During the campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, Sherman maintained excellent communications with Grant via the telegraph. He noted that "hardly a day intervened when General Grant did not know the exact state of facts with me."¹³ This high degree of connectivity allowed for coordination of effort between Grant in Virginia and Sherman in Georgia. It was clear, however, that in the

subsequent campaign through Georgia, Sherman would be "free to execute it in [his] own way."¹⁴

Even with telegraph support, command and control functions during the Chattanooga to Atlanta operations posed serious challenges. Sherman communicated with his subordinate commanders primarily via face-to- face or written communications, both subject to significant limitations. If Sherman happened to be on the field, he could provide orders directly to his subordinates. Due to the exigencies of time he occasionally dealt directly with divisional or corps commanders. When time permitted, Sherman established direct telegraphic links with his commanders. Prior to the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, "to be in close communication with all parts of the army, [Sherman] had a place cleared on top of a hill...and had the telegraph wires laid to it."¹⁵ Sherman's staff was organized to improve efficiency. He believed "a bulky staff implies a division of responsibility, slowness of action, and indecision."¹⁶ Thus he maintained the size of his staff at the minimum required. Even with the communications limitations of the day, Sherman successfully guided his subordinates to achieve unity of effort.

Operational Movement and Maneuver

As discussed above, Sherman's objective was the destruction of Johnston's army. He hoped for a decisive battle, but was reluctant to attack Johnston's fortifications directly. Thus he envisioned a series of maneuvers to flank the enemy out of his fixed positions. Sherman's plan for the employment of his army was

...to have one part exposed inviting an attack by the enemy, aiming to inflict on him a superior loss while the rest of the army is moving to some exposed and vital object or line of retreat to the enemy.¹⁷

Sherman understood that such a plan involved risk, but he gambled that he would be able to concentrate his forces for a general engagement before Johnston could destroy one segment of his army via sudden assault.¹⁸

Sherman repeatedly utilized successful turning movements as the Union forces moved south. At Rocky Face, the first contact with the concentrated force of Johnston's army, Sherman feinted in front with the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio, while McPherson's Army of the Tennessee conducted a maneuver to the west in an attempt to sever the enemy lines of communication. Detecting the danger, Johnston withdrew his forces south to Allatoona. Sherman was familiar with the local terrain having been assigned to the area as a lieutenant in 1844.¹⁹ He recognized the formidable nature of the Allatoona defenses, and again employed a turning movement to avoid a frontal assault. He boldly left his rail supply line and marched his army with twenty days of supplies around the Confederate left flank to rejoin the railroad near Dallas. As his troops approached the rail line, fierce resistance was encountered at New Hope Church. Sherman regained contact with the railroad by extending his left, again forcing Johnston to retreat.

After the action outside Dallas, Sherman ordered a frontal assault on the strong Confederate defenses at Kennesaw Mountain. After a costly repulse Sherman conducted another series of flanking marches, forcing Johnston to fall back to the defenses at the Chattahoochie River, just outside Atlanta. This move led to Johnston's relief by the aggressive Hood, who engaged the Union forces in a series of costly attacks around Atlanta. Sherman eventually forced Hood's army to evacuate Atlanta by employing yet another flanking maneuver to cut the Confederate supply line at Jonesboro, south of the city. Sherman occupied Atlanta on September 2nd 1864.

Sherman's success in the use of flanking movements was enhanced by the mobility of his forces. As he believed "...a soldier should [not] be loaded down too much."²⁰ he organized his forces to carry a minimum of supplies and other essential equipment, supplementing the army's needs by foraging.²¹ He envisioned a "huge flying column of light infantry."²²

In November, Sherman was ready to launch his offensive to Savannah. Emphasizing mobility and speed of advance he "...purged his forces of the weak, wounded and sick."²³ Hood's Army of Tennessee was still a threat in northern Georgia and Alabama, so Sherman detached Thomas and Schofield with sufficient forces to protect Union bases in Tennessee. He organized his remaining forces, totaling approximately 60,000 troops, into two wings, the left wing under General Henry Slocum and the right wing under General Otis Howard.²⁴ On November 12th 1864 Sherman ordered the destruction of the Western & Atlantic railroad from Atlanta north to Dalton, cutting his lines of communication, and started his army to the southeast on November 15th. Sherman's troops maintained a rapid pace, averaging twelve miles per day,²⁵ and entered Savannah on December 21st. Sherman's mobility and speed played a significant role in his success, as the southern commanders could not move or concentrate forces quickly enough to offer Sherman any significant resistance.

Operational Logistics.

Sherman understood the key importance of logistics in the success of his operations, noting "the feeding of an army...demands the earliest attention of a general intrusted (sic) with a campaign."²⁶ Logistics planning was particularly important in the campaign into north Georgia as Union forces would be operating along extended lines of communication. To supply his huge force, Sherman would require "1300 tons of goods every day."²⁷ In order to

reach this level of support and build appropriate stockpiles, Sherman issued on April 6th 1864 a general order, limiting use of rail-road cars to transporting only the essential articles of food, ammunition and supplies for the army.²⁸ By the commencement of offensive operations in May, Sherman had stockpiled four months of stores in his depots, receiving 193 freight cars daily.²⁹

As Sherman's troops moved south, they became increasingly dependant on the line of the Western & Atlantic railroad for support. "Every musketball, every powder charge, cannonball and shell, every ounce of basic food supplies....[and] every replacement soldier"³⁰ came to Sherman via this link. The need to protect this vulnerable line against Confederate raiders proved a great drain on Sherman's resources, necessitating detachments of troops to guard the line and garrison key outposts. However, Sherman was prepared to forage for food if circumstances required it. In a letter to Grant on April 10th 1864, Sherman noted "Georgia has a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve."³¹ Sherman obtained a "volume describing the population, livestock and agricultural produce of Georgia, county by county."³² This information would prove very valuable during Sherman's later march to Savannah. After the war, Sherman indicated that there was a "reasonable probability that, without [this information], I would not have undertaken what was done."³³

Despite his dependence on the railroad link to Chattanooga and Nashville, Sherman increased his mobility by limiting tents, wagons and other non-essential equipment, thus reducing the size of the army's supply train. He believed "an army is efficient for action and motion exactly in the inverse ratio of its impedimenta."³⁴ This improved mobility allowed Sherman the flexibility to occasionally break loose from his fixed line of communication in an attempt to gain advantage on the enemy. For example, in order to avoid a frontal assault

on strong defenses at Allatoona Pass, Sherman loaded his wagons with sufficient stores for 20 days, then left the railroad to conduct a turning movement to rejoin the railroad in the enemy's rear.³⁵

To conduct the march to Savannah, Sherman would have to permanently break free from his rail lifeline and forage off the land as Grant had done during the Vicksburg campaign in 1863.³⁶ Sherman learned from his experience serving under Grant, and had successfully used such an approach during operations around Meridian, Mississippi in February 1864.³⁷ Sherman "imposed rigid restrictions...on the items the army could take with it."³⁸ The supply trains consisted of "2,500 wagons and 600 light ambulances. Rations for twenty days and forage for five were carried, as well as 200 rounds of ammunition per man...while each soldier marched out with 40 rounds on his person."³⁹ In addition, the army traveled with enough live beef for forty days in the field.⁴⁰

During the march, Sherman's army was well supplied by teams of foragers, known as "bummers."⁴¹ These men scouted ahead and to the flanks of the marching troops, returning in the evening with a bounty of foodstuffs from Georgia farmlands previously untouched by the war.

Operational Protection.

As previously noted, Sherman's army was heavily dependant on the railroad link between Chattanooga and Atlanta for supplies, food and reinforcements. As he moved south Sherman detached troops to protect the railroad and garrison key points. He also directed forces from Tennessee to deter Confederate cavalry raiders such as Nathan Bedford Forrest.⁴² Sherman successfully used his own cavalry to screen his movements as well as deceive the enemy as to his intentions. For example, as Sherman's forces approached the Chattahoochee

River he used cavalry forces on his right flank to feign searching for a river crossing while he planned to actually cross the river to the left.

Sherman also successfully used deception during the march to Savannah. As the two wings of his army moved southeast, he induced the massing of the available Confederate forces at various points then bypassed them, "leaving the troops useless and unavailable."⁴³

IV. Conclusions and Operational Lessons Learned.

Though the destruction of the Confederate army was Sherman's primary objective, he planned a campaign based on maneuver rather than direct assault. In order to avoid costly frontal assaults, Sherman skillfully blended the advantages of the wilderness terrain into his maneuvers. The same terrain that provided excellent defensive positions for Johnston served to screen Sherman's movements. Some of Sherman's success can be attributed to his knowledge of his opponent. Johnston's cautious nature made it unlikely he would leave his prepared fortifications to attack Sherman's forces; he preferred to stay within his defenses and invite attack. After the war, Johnston claimed "I know I should have beaten him had he made such assaults on me as General Grant did on Lee."⁴⁴ Sherman refused to engage in such attacks with one notable exception at Kennesaw Mountain. From the defensive positions atop Kennesaw the movements of the Union Army were in full view of Johnston's forces, negating much of Sherman's ability to mask his army's movements. Sherman's justification for the attack on Kennesaw Mountain was that "...the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines."⁴⁵ The attack resulted in a costly repulse; Sherman eventually resorted to another turning movement, forcing Johnston to again withdraw to the south. Had Sherman ordered the turning movement initially, as he did under similar circumstances at Allatoona, he probably would

have achieved the same result without the casualties suffered in the attack on Kennesaw Mountain. Sherman's experience shows that under the right circumstances, maneuver to threaten enemy critical vulnerabilities is the most desirable option for a commander. Current doctrine, stressing maneuver as one of the primary elements of combat power⁴⁶, states that "the main feature of an offensive battle is the outflanking or bypassing of the defender."⁴⁷ However, maneuver may not always be the right choice for a commander. In certain circumstances a frontal assault might provide the only means of gaining advantage over an enemy. Current doctrine stresses that such assaults should only be undertaken when "...no other approach will accomplish the mission."⁴⁸ Sherman's failed assault on Kennesaw Mountain is a prime example of this principle.

Sherman's use of flanking movements disoriented Johnston from the beginning of the campaign.⁴⁹ Sherman continued to take advantage of his superior mobility by flanking the enemy and avoiding, for the most part, costly frontal assaults. As a Confederate prisoner noted, "Sherman'll never go to hell. He will flank the devil and make heaven in spite of the guards."⁵⁰ Sherman maintained the initiative and freedom of action by staying with his plan: he did what he wanted to do, rather than what the enemy wanted him to do.

Logistics.

Sherman clearly understood the importance of logistics and preparations. He noted, "the least part of a general's work is to fight a battle."⁵¹ Sherman's thorough knowledge of his army's requirements was key in the massing of sufficient supplies to support offensive operations. Sherman's design is reflected in current U.S. Army doctrine, which stresses the importance of preparing bases of operation, selecting and improving lines of communication, preparing forward logistics bases and stockpiling resources.⁵² Due to the limited quantity of

rolling stock available, Sherman took control of rail traffic to ensure the movement of men and materiel to his army. While today's commander will probably not have authority or opportunity to commandeer his own strategic lift, Sherman's actions highlight the need for robust lift capability, with the proper assets dedicated to moving supplies and reinforcements.

OMFTS.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) is a concept that envisions "the maneuver of naval expeditionary forces at the operational level of warfare, to exploit enemy weaknesses and deliver a decisive blow."⁵³ Under OMFTS, a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) could project power ashore against enemy centers of gravity without depending on a large, land-based logistics infrastructure. Logistics support would be primarily sea-based, allowing for greater freedom of action.⁵⁴ One of the tenets of OMFTS is maneuver warfare with a light, mobile force.

While Sherman's campaign through Georgia was not amphibious in nature, it can serve as a model for certain aspects of the OMFTS concept. Sherman's forces were light, carrying a minimum number of tents, wagons and other supplies. Today's forces require an immense amount of logistical support, due to a large number of personnel, sophisticated weapons systems and vehicles. As Sherman increased his mobility by reducing personnel and limiting impediments, successful implementation of OMFTS may also depend on the reduction of logistical demand by reducing the number of troops, weapons and heavy vehicles that go ashore with a MAGTF.

A smaller, lighter force is more supportable⁵⁵, a fact that was equally true in 1864 as it is today. It is critical to note that Sherman's march from Atlanta to Savannah would not have been possible had any significant opposition been anticipated. Without a dedicated line

of communications to allow for re-supply, Sherman's limited quantity of ammunition would have been exhausted quickly in battle, leaving his force vulnerable. In addition, Sherman took advantage of a region previously unscathed by the war. Ample food and forage was available, contributing significantly to Sherman's speed of advance. The same type of operation would probably not have been possible in war-ravaged regions such as northern Virginia, where three years of war had seriously depleted resources necessary to support an army in the field. Today's forces are also dependant on fuel re-supply as well as ammunition. Vehicles must be employed in order to achieve the desired level of mobility,⁵⁶ yet it is unrealistic to expect a MAGTF to carry sufficient fuel to operate for any significant length of time. To be successful, OMFTS should strive for a balance between self-sustainment and sea-based support.

Sherman improved the mobility of his force in several ways. He reduced his overall number of personnel, retaining the strongest veterans, and limited the length of his supply train. Sherman's veteran troops carried a minimum of equipment on their persons, having learned from years of marching and fighting which items were essential. The modern soldier carries a much larger variety of equipment into battle. While mobility is a great advantage, it is risky to seek mobility at the cost of combat power or sustainment. The commander should ensure forces and equipment required are matched to the threat or mission.

Echoes of Sherman can be heard in the new Bush administration. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is leading a review which seems to favor "...a fundamental change toward a leaner, nimbler military."⁵⁷ While the Rumsfeld review is not yet complete, its apparent focus on lighter, faster forces could set a template for logistics, procurement, force structure and employment which will drive U.S defense policy well into the future. In

his Georgia campaign, Sherman emphasized maneuver, mobility and logistical self-sufficiency to the maximum extent possible. In future conflicts, U.S. forces may not have the luxury of secure bases of operations in the theater of operations or a lengthy period to build up supplies prior to commencement of hostilities.⁵⁸ Success in such conflicts may depend on concepts such as OMFTS, with forces operating very much like Sherman did in 1864.

Summary. Grant's direction to Sherman specified the Confederate army as his primary objective, followed by damage to enemy war resources. Sherman failed to meet his primary objective, in a physical sense. The Confederate Army of Tennessee under Hood was left to invade Tennessee, where it was eventually destroyed by his subordinate in battles at Franklin and Nashville. However, by taking Atlanta and inflicting significant damage on southern resources, Sherman effectively removed the Army of Tennessee from any relevance and greatly accelerated the end of the war. Sherman's thorough preparations, skillful use of a light, mobile force and bold movements behind enemy lines without a fixed line of communication are a model for the use of maneuver warfare. Sherman's operations provide a template for modern concepts such as OMFTS, as the U.S military strives to become a more agile force, less reliant on fixed bases and a large logistics infrastructure.

¹ Ronald H. Bailey, Battles for Atlanta: Sherman Moves East, (Alexandria, VA:Time-Life Books 1985), 20.

² Ibid.

³ William T. Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea, (London:The Folio Society LTD 1961), 9.

⁴ Ibid, 11.

⁵ John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order, (New York: The Free Press 1993), 260.

⁶ Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1991), 326.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Sherman, 24.

⁹ William Key, The Battle of Atlanta, (Atlanta: Peachtree Publishers, LTD 1981), 37.

¹⁰ Ibid, 85.

¹¹ John B. Walters, Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1973), 156.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ William T. Sherman, War is Hell, (Savannah, GA: The Beehive Press 1974), 10.

¹⁴ Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea, 29.

¹⁵ Ibid, 61.

¹⁶ Sherman, War is Hell, 13.

¹⁷ Royster, 326.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Key, 18.

²⁰ Sherman, War is Hell, 5.

²¹ Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea, 11.

²² B. H. Liddell-Hart, Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American, (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company 1929), 331.

²³ Key, 85.

²⁴ Ibid, 84.

²⁵ James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Ballantine Books 1989), 809.

²⁶ Sherman, War is Hell, 4

²⁷ Marszalek, 261.

²⁸ Sherman, War is Hell, 19.

²⁹ Bailey, 27.

³⁰ Key, 37.

³¹ Sherman, War is Hell, 26.

³² Royster, 329.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Sherman, War is Hell, 14.

³⁵ Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea, 45.

³⁶ Russell F. Weigley, A Great Civil War, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 2000), 266.

³⁷ Marszalek, 294.

³⁸ Joseph T. Glathaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 1995), 101.

³⁹ Hart, 332.

⁴⁰ Key, 85.

⁴¹ McPherson, 815.

⁴² Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea, 54.

⁴³ Royster, 329.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 327.

⁴⁵ Marszalek, 272.

⁴⁶ Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: 14 June 1993), 2-10.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 7-1.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 7-0.

⁴⁹ Royster, 327.

⁵⁰ Bailey, 62.

⁵¹ Ibid, 21.

⁵² Operations, 12-5 to 12-9.

⁵³ Charles C. Krulak, "Operational Maneuver From the Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 1997): 27.

⁵⁴ Patrick G. Howard and Len Blasiol, "OMFTS: Forging a Path to the Future of Amphibious Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette (June 1999): 23.

⁵⁵ William A. Sayers, "OMFTS Impact," Marine Corps Gazette (September 1999): 48.

⁵⁶ Michael F. Morris, "Flying Columns and OMFTS," Marine Corps Gazette (March 1998): 27.

⁵⁷ Michael Moran, "Sacred Cows in the Cross Hairs," The Secret Empire: The U.S. Military in the 21st Century, 30 March 2001, <<http://www.msnbc.com/>>, [22 April 2000].

⁵⁸ Ibid.

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